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SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE OF
INTEREST RATES
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Abstract. When long maturity bonds are traded frequently and traders have non-nested
information sets, speculative behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978) arises.
Using a term structure model displaying such speculative behavior, this paper proposes an
empirically plausible re-interpretation of predictable excess returns that is not based on the
value traders attach to a marginal increase of wealth in dierent states of the world. It
is demonstrated that (i) dispersion of expectations about future short rates is sucient for
individual traders to systematically predict excess returns even in a model with constant risk
premia and (ii) the new term structure dynamics driven by speculative trade is orthogonal
to public information in real time. The model is estimated using monthly data on US
short to medium term Treasuries from 1964 to 2007 and it provides a very good t of the
data, comparing favorably to a standard ane three factor no-arbitrage model. Speculative
dynamics are also found to be quantitatively important, accounting for a substantial fraction
of the variation of bond yields and is more important at long maturities.
Keywords: Term structure of interest rates; Speculative dynamics; Excess returns; Non-
nested information; Private information
1. Introduction
When long bonds are traded before they mature, the price an individual trader will be
willing to pay for a bond depends on how much he thinks other traders will be willing to pay
for it in the future. If traders have access to dierent information, this price may dier from
what an individual trader would be willing to pay for the bond if he had to hold it until it
matures and \speculative behavior" in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978) arises. That
is, the possibility of reselling a bond changes its equilibrium price as traders exploit what
they perceive to be market misperceptions about future short rates.
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In this paper we present a term structure model populated with rational traders that
engage in the type of speculative behavior described above. We use this model to argue
that relaxing the assumption that all traders have access to the same information introduces
empirically relevant new dynamics to the term structure of interest rates. More specically,
we show that (i) individual traders can systematically predict excess returns (dened as the
dierence in return on holding an n period bond until it matures and holding a sequence of
short bonds for n periods) even in a model with constant risk premia. (ii) Individual traders
can predict and take advantage of other traders' prediction errors even though no trader
on average is better informed than other traders and (iii) that the speculative dynamics
introduced by non-nested information sets are orthogonal to public information.
Despite the fact that the speculative dynamics are orthogonal to public information, we
can both quantify their importance as well as back out an estimated historical time series
of their evolution in the past. This is possible since we as econometricians have access to
the full sample of data and the speculative term is orthogonal only to public information
available to traders in real time. That is, we can use public information available in period
t+s : s > 0 to back out an estimate of the speculative term in period t. The estimated model
suggests that speculative dynamics are quantitatively important and explains a substantial
fraction of the variation in observed US bond yields.
A necessary condition for traders to have any relevant private information about future
bond yields is that bond prices cannot perfectly reveal the state of the economy. Recent
statistical evidence appear to support this view. In a few closely related papers, Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2005, 2008) and Duee (2008) present evidence suggesting that the factors that
can be found by inverting yields are not sucient to optimally predict future bond returns.
They nd that while the usual level, slope and curvature factors explain virtually all of the
cross sectional variation, additional factors are needed to forecast excess returns. Ludvigson
and Ng (2009) provide more evidence that current bond yields are not sucient to optimally
forecast bond returns. They show that drawing on a very large panel of macroeconomic
data helps predict deviations from the expectations hypothesis, or equivalently, future excess
returns, compared to using only yield data. Stated another way, these statistical models all
suggest that linear combinations of current bond yields are not sucient to predict future
bond yields optimally.
In addition to the empirical evidence cited above, we also have a priori reasons to believe
that bond prices should not reveal all information relevant to predicting future bond returns.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argued that if it is costly to gather information and prices are
observed costlessly, prices cannot fully reveal all information relevant for predicting future
returns. For the bond market, the most important variable to forecast is the short interest
rate. In most developed countries, the short interest rate is set by a central bank that
responds to macroeconomic developments. If it is costly to gather information about the
macro economy, Grossman and Stiglitz's argument implies that bond prices cannot reveal
all information relevant to predict future bond returns.
If prices do not reveal all information relevant for predicting bond returns, it becomes more
probable that traders have non-nested information sets, that is, traders will have access toSPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 3
and use dierent information when trading.1 With the exceptions of bond prices, statements
by central bank ocials and some well publicized macroeconomic data releases, it is hard
to think of sources of information that are public in the strong common knowledge sense
of the word. In this paper we allow for traders to have private information that they can
exploit when trading. This also seems to accord well with casual observation that at least
one motive for trade in assets is possession of information that is not, or at least is not
believed to be, already reected in prices.
One implication of non-nested information sets is that expectations across individual
traders will dier which provides us with another way of gauging the plausibility of this
assumption. While bond traders' expectations are unobservable, Swanson (2006) presents
evidence that professional forecasters' expectations of future interest rates are surprisingly
widely dispersed. Citing numbers from the Blue Chip Survey of professional forecasters from
1992-2004, Swanson reports that the spread between the 10th and the 90th percentile of in-
dividual forecasts of the 3-month Treasury Bill rate 4 quarters ahead uctuates between 80
and 220 basis points.
There is a growing literature analyzing asset pricing models under non-nested information
sets (or one of its synonyms, see Footnote 1). Singleton (1987) is an early reference of a
dynamic asset pricing model with an information structure similar to the one presented
here. More recent examples include papers by Allen, Morris and Shin (2005), Kasa, Walker
and Whiteman (2008), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005, 2007), Cespa and Vives (2009)
and Makarov and Rytchkov (2009). These papers either present purely theoretical models
or models calibrated to explain some feature of the data. In this paper, we estimate the
model directly using Bayesian methods with uniform priors truncated only to ensure that
the model is stationary and that variances are non-negative. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the rst paper to estimate a model with non-nested information sets. The t of
the model is surprisingly good and compares favorably to the t of a standard ane three
factor no-arbitrage model. The model is also used to quantify the cross-sectional dispersion
of expectations implied by the posterior parameter estimates. A small implied dispersion
across traders of short rate expectations is found to be sucient to generate quantitatively
important speculative dynamics in bond yields.
Using the estimated model to generate articial data, we further show that an econome-
trician estimating an ane three factor no-arbitrage model would nd overwhelming but
misleading statistical evidence in favor of time varying risk premia if the model with non-
nested information sets was the true data generating process. The estimated model also
displays similar dynamics to those documented by Duee (2008) and Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005, 2008). Factors that play practically no role in explaining the cross section of bond
yields have predictive power for future yields. This is arguably an intrinsic feature of models
with imperfectly informed traders. If the true state of the economy could be summarized
by three factors that are an exact linear function of yields, no other factor could possibly
1What I in this paper call non-nested information sets is also known as disparately informed traders
(Singleton 1987), private information (Sargent 1991), heterogenous information (Bacchetta and van Wincoop
2006), dispersed information (Angeletos and Pavan 2009) and imperfect common knowledge (Woodford 2002,
Adam 2006 and Nimark 2008). The term non-nested information connects naturally to the language of
orthogonal projections used in this paper.4 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
add predictive power. We demonstrate that the model presented here can account for the
evidence in Duee (2008) by computing Duee's impulse responses estimated on articial
data generated from our model.
The next section presents a simple bond pricing model that allows for traders to have non-
nested information sets. Section 3 uses the properties of orthogonal projections to derive
the main theoretical results and Section 4 contains the estimated model and discusses the
quantitative importance of speculative dynamics. Section 5 relates the model to a popular
class of alternative models. Section 6 concludes and the Appendix contains details of how the
model was solved and lists some of the properties of orthogonal projections used in Section
3.
2. A Bond Pricing Model
In this section we present a simple bond pricing model. The price of a bond depends
on the average expectation of the price of the same bond in the next period, discounted
by the one period interest rate, and a stochastic supply shock. In the absence of private
information, the model implies that the expectations hypothesis holds and the simplicity of
the model helps to highlight the consequences for term structure dynamics of relaxing the
assumption that traders all have access to the same information.
2.1. Demand for long maturity bonds. As in Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) there are
overlapping generations of agents who each live for two periods. Time is discrete and indexed
by t: Each generation consists of a continuum of households with unit mass. Each household
is endowed with one unit of wealth that it invests when young. When old, households unwind
their asset positions and consume. Unlike in the model of Allen et al, the owners of wealth,
i.e. the households, do not trade assets themselves. Instead, a continuum of traders, indexed
by j 2 (0;1); trade on behalf of the households, with households diversifying their available
funds across the continuum of traders. While not modeled explicitly here, this set up can be
motivated as a perfectly competitive limit case of the monopolistically competitive mutual
funds model of Garcia and Vanden (2009) that allow uninformed households to benet from
mutual funds private information, while diversifying away idiosyncratic risk associated with
individual funds.
Trader j invests one unit of wealth in period t on behalf of all households born in period
t: In period t+1 trader j unwinds the position of the now old generation of households who
then use the proceeds to consume. Traders are innitely lived and perform the same service
for the next generation of households. The set up with short lived investors but innitely
lived traders implies that private information is long-lived while abstracting from wealth
dynamics.2
There are two types of assets. A risk free one period bond with (log) return rt and risky
zero-coupon bonds of various maturities. Trader j chooses a vector of portfolio weights at(j)
in order to maximize the discounted expected log of wealth under management Wt+1(j) in
2Readers interested in the interaction between wealth dynamics and heterogenous beliefs can consult
Xiong and Yan (2009) who analyze this issue in a model with boundedly rational traders.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 5
period t + 1: That is, trader j solves the problem
max
at(j)
E [logWt+1(j) j 
t(j)] (2.1)
subject to




t(j) denotes trader j's information set and r
p
t(j) is the log return of the portfolio
chosen by trader j in period t. In the model presented below, equilibrium log returns of
individual bonds are normally distributed. However, the log return on a portfolio of assets
with individual log normal returns is not normally distributed. Following Campbell and
Viceira (2002a, 2002b) we therefore use a second order Taylor expansion to approximate the
log excess portfolio return as
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where bt is a vector of (log) bond prices for bonds of dierent maturities. The vector b
 
t+1
contains the prices of the same bonds in the next period when they have one period less to
maturity and rt is a vector of the risk free rate rt. The dierence b
 
t+1   bt   rt is thus a
vector of excess returns on bonds of dierent maturities. The matrix b;t(j) is the covariance
of log bond returns conditional on trader j's information set. In the next section, we give
general conditions for traders' information sets that are sucient to generate speculative
behavior. In the empirical part of the paper we will be explicit about the exact nature
of traders's information sets and specify processes for the short interest rate rt and traders'
information sets 
t(j) such that in equilibrium, conditional returns are normally distributed,
time invariant and with a common covariance across all traders. We therefore suppress the
subscripts and trader indices on the conditional return covariance matrix and write b instead
of b;t(j) for all t and j. We will also maintain the assumption throughout the paper that
current bond prices bt and the current short rate rt are observed perfectly by all traders so
that
fbt;rtg 2 
t(j) 8 j (2.4)
Maximizing the (second order Taylor approximation) of the expected return (2.3) on wealth



















b diag [b] (2.5)
Since each trader j has one unit of wealth to invest, taking average across traders of the
portfolio weights (2.5) yields the aggregate demand for bonds.
2.2. Bond supply. The vector of bond supply st is stochastic
st = 
 1
b vt : vt  N (0;v) (2.6)
where to simplify notation, the vector of supply shocks vt are normalized by the inverse of
the conditional variance of bond prices 
 1
b . The supply shocks vt play a similar role here as
the noise traders in Admati (1985). That is, they will prevent equilibrium prices from fully
revealing the information held by other traders.6 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
2.3. Equilibrium bond prices. Equating aggregate demand
R
at(j)dj and supply st

 1


















b diag [b] (2.7)













dj   vt (2.8)
A generic element of bt is thus the log price bn

















where n and vn
t are the relevant elements of 1
2diag [b] and vt respectively. The price of an
n periods to maturity bond in period t thus depends on the average expectation in period
t of the price of a n   1 period bond in period t + 1. The more a trader expects to be able
to sell a bond for in the future, the more is he willing to pay for it today. However, risk
aversion prevents the most optimistic trader from demanding all of the available supply.
2.4. The term structure of interest rates. The bond price formula (2.9) can be used
to price any maturity bond. The procedure is similar to deriving bond prices under a no
arbitrage assumption, though we need to be more careful in specifying the timing of the




t =  rt (2.10)
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The price of a three period bond according to (2.9) is given by the average expectation of
the price of a two period bond in t + 1, discounted by the short rate rt. Leading (2.11) by
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2.5. Deviations from means. Since we are primarily interested in the eects of infor-
mation on the dynamics of bond yields we will conduct most of the analysis in terms of
deviations of the log price from its (known) mean. We therefore dene the log deviation e bn
t









b  E [bn
t ]: Similarly, dene the deviation of the short interest rate rt from its mean
r
e rt  rt   r (2.16)
where r  E [rt]: Subtracting n
b and r from (2.13) and substituting into the expression







As has been noted before (e.g. Allen, Morris and Shin (2006)), the fact that (2.13) contains
average expectations of average expectations (and so on) prevents us from applying the law
of iterated expectations to solve for bond prices if traders have non-nested information sets.
Before analyzing the consequences of this, we rst establish that in the absence of supply
shocks and with only common information, the model does indeed imply that the expectation
hypothesis hold. Below, the properties of orthogonal projections will be used extensively and
we therefore rst dene orthogonal projections and the relevant inner product space.
2.6. Projections and a common information benchmark. In the next section, the
properties of orthogonal projections will be used to analyze the implications of non-nested
information sets. However, we rst apply some of these tools to the familiar case where all
traders share the same information set. This section can thus be thought of as a benchmark,
conrming that in the absence of private information the model implies that the expectation
hypothesis hold. (For readers unfamiliar with orthogonal projections, the Appendix lists
some of the properties that will be particularly useful below. For more details see Brockwell
and Davis (2006).)
In the model presented below, all bond yields, the factors that drive them and the signals
that traders observe will be elements of the inner product space L2, which we now dene.8 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
Denition 1. (The inner-product space L2:) The inner product space L2 is the collection C
of all random variables X with nite variance
EX
2 < 1 (2.18)
and with inner-product
hX;Y i  E (XY ) : X;Y 2 L
2 (2.19)
Denition 2. Let 
 be a subspace of L2: An orthogonal projection of X onto 
 , denoted
P
X, is the unique element in L2 satisfying
hX   P
X;!i = 0 (2.20)
for any ! 2 
:
In a linear model with Gaussian shocks, conditional expectations are equivalent to orthog-
onal projections. We can thus use the equality
E (X j 
) = P
X (2.21)
to replace the conditional expectations in the bond pricing equation (2.13) with projections
and rephrase the expectation hypothesis in the following way.
Denition 3. (The Expectations Hypothesis.) The expectations hypothesis of the term struc-
ture of interest rates is said to hold with respect to 
t if the implied forward rate
f
n










te rt+n 8t;n (2.23)
This is a standard denition of the expectation hypothesis (e.g. Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar
and Wu, 2001), apart from the explicit reference to the information set expectations are
conditioned on.
We can use the denition (2.23) to demonstrate that in the absence of supply shocks, the
bond pricing equation (2.13) implies that the expectations hypothesis hold if all agents share
the same information set. Consider the 2 period ahead forward rate which by (2.13) and
(2.22) is given by
f
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For now, let 
t(j) = 
t for all j, that is, let the information set 
t be common across all
traders. If traders do not forget, the sequence of information sets f
tg
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t. It is a property of projections that repeated projections




tX for s  0. This is simply the law of iterated expectations and implies
that traders cannot predict in period t how they will revise their expectation in periodSPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 9












The expectation hypothesis then holds for a three period bond with respect to the common
information set 
t. A similar argument can be generalized to an n-period bond.
In the next section we analyze how the dynamics of the term structure changes when
traders have non-nested information sets. The direct link between forward rates and expec-
tations about future short rates make it more convenient to frame the analysis in terms of
forward rates rather than bond yields. Of course, bond yields can always be backed out from
implied forward rates by the identity (2.22).
3. Non-nested information sets and the term structure of interest rates
In the previous section, the fact that rational traders cannot predict the direction in which
they will revise their own expectations in the future allowed us to solve for bond prices as
a function of the common period t expectation about future short rates. With non-nested
information sets, predictions about the expectations of others are distinct from one's own
expectations. If a trader's current prediction about future short rates dier from his expec-
tation about other traders' predictions, it is rational for him to believe that other traders in
the future will revise their predictions in the direction towards what he considers the best
prediction, as more information becomes available. This section draws out the consequences
of this fact for the term structure and contains the main theoretical contributions of the
paper.
First, it is demonstrated that dispersed expectations about future short rates is sucient
for traders to be able to predict excess returns, even though risk premia are constant in
the model. Secondly, we show that with non-nested information sets, individual traders can
predict the average prediction error made by others which introduces speculative behavior
in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978). Third, it is shown that the speculative dynamics
introduced by non-nested information sets are orthogonal to public information which has
interesting implications for how the speculative dynamics can (and cannot) be quantied
using public bond price data. We start by dening what it means for information sets to be
non-nested.
Denition 4. The subspace 
t(j) is the space spanned by the history of variables observed
by trader j at period t. Projections onto 
t(j) are denoted Pt;j:





t+s(j) if and only if
Pt;je rt+n 6= Pt+s;ie rt+n : j 6= i (3.1)
for s = 0;1;2;::n   1 and for at least some t = 0;1;2:::
Information sets are thus considered non-nested if two traders in at least some period t
disagree about the best prediction of the short rate in period t + n and expects to disagree10 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
up until period t + n when the short rate e rt+n is observed. Dening non-nested information
sets through the implications for projections of short rates onto individual trader's informa-
tion sets is somewhat tailored to the needs of this paper. A more general denition would
simply state that information sets are non-nested if projections of any random variable onto
individual traders' information sets dier (see Brockwell and Davis 2006). The denition
used here is designed to avoid trivial cases where projections only dier about uninterest-
ing quantities. We therefore dene information sets as non-nested only if they imply that
expectations about future short rates dier across agents.
3.1. Predictable excess returns. We start by proving that non-nested information sets
are sucient for individual traders to be able to predict excess returns. We do this in two
steps. First, we show that if individual traders' projections of future short rates are dispersed,
then the n period forward rate fn
t cannot coincide generally with traders' expectations about
the corresponding future short rates.
Proposition 1. The forward rate fn
t is agent j's optimal prediction of the short rate n
periods ahead, if and only if it coincides with the orthogonal projection of e rt+n onto trader
j's information set 
t(j) so that
Pt;je rt+n = f
n
t (3.2)
holds. The equality (3.2) can only hold generally, i.e. for all traders at all times, when
traders' information sets coincide.
Proof. The rst half of the proposition holds by the optimality and uniqueness of orthog-
onal projections. The second half states that Pt;je rt+n = fn
t can hold generally only when
information sets are nested. To see why this is true, note that if
Pt;je rt+n = f
n
t 8 j;t;n
then the ex ante symmetry of traders implies that
Pt;je rt+n = Pt;ie rt+n 8 j;i;t;n (3.3)
or that the forward rate fn
t is the best predictor of e rt+n for trader j at all times t and
at all horizons n only when it is also the best prediction for all others traders, i.e. when
information sets are nested. 
In words, Proposition 1 simply states that if the distribution across traders of expected
future short rates is non-degenerate, all points on the support of the distribution cannot
coincide with the forward rate, which is a single number. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and
may seem like an obvious statement, but the uniqueness of orthogonal projections makes it
nevertheless interesting. To see why, note that by the uniqueness of orthogonal projections,
Pt;je rt+n 6= fn
t implies that Pt;j (e rt+n   fn
t ) 6= 0; i.e. trader j can systematically predict the
forecast error a person would make who used the forward rate as a forecast of the short rate.
The next proposition shows that this in turn implies that traders can systematically predict
excess returns.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 11















Figure 1. Dispersion of expectations of the short rate in period t+n and the
implied forward rate.
Denition 6. (Excess return) The excess return on an n period bond is the dierence in
return between holding an n period bond until maturity and the return on holding a sequence
of one period bonds over n periods, i.e.
 e b
n
t   (e rt + e rt+1 + :::e rt+n 1) (3.4)
An alternative (and more common) denition of excess returns would be to dene it as






t   e rt (3.5)
This denition is equivalent to (3.4) in the sense that if the expectations hypothesis hold,
expected excess returns will be zero according to both denitions (see Singleton 2006). The
denition (3.4) is somewhat more convenient to work with in the present setting, but either
denition could be used without changing the substance of the results presented below. We
now use the result from Proposition 1 to show that non-nested information sets imply that
individual traders can predict excess returns.
Proposition 2. If traders' information sets are non-nested, excess returns are predictable
by trader j for at least some maturity n.






t   (e rt + e rt+1 + :::e rt+n 1)

6= 0 (3.6)
for some t. From the identity
 e b
n
t  e rt + f
1
t + ::: + f
n 1
t (3.7)12 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK









We know from Proposition 1 that Pt;je rt+n 6= fn
t holds for at least some, t, n and j if
information sets are non-nested. To prove the proposition we need to show that this in turn
implies that the inequality (3.8) must be true for at least some maturity n. The proposition
holds trivially for n = 2 since the inequality (3.8) then is true by assumption. For n > 2,









which can equivalently be written as
n 1 X
s=1








Since by assumption, Pt;je rt+n 6= fn









which implies that excess returns on an n = n period bond is predictable. To complete the
proof, it is sucient to note that the proposition is trivially true for n = n + 1 if (3.9) fails
to hold. That is, if Pt;je rt+n 6= fn
t excess returns cannot simultaneously be unpredictable for
bonds of both maturity n and n + 1. 
3.2. Non-nested information sets and speculative trade. Proposition 1 and 2 com-
bined demonstrated that a non-degenerate distribution of short rate expectations is sucient
for excess returns to be predictable by individual traders. The next propositions helps us
understand more about the dynamics introduced to the term structure by non-nested in-
formation sets and how these dynamics relate to public and private information. First, we
demonstrate that non-nested information sets imply that individual traders can predict the
average prediction errors made by other traders.
Proposition 3. Non-nested information sets imply that an individual trader j can system-














t+s(j) for s = 0;1;2:::n   1 and all j 6= i 2 (0;1):
Proof. The expression (3.12) can be rearranged to
Pt;je rt+n = Pt;j
Z
Pt+s;j0e rt+ndj
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Since traders do not receive signals that are informative about the idiosyncratic noise in




0 = Pt;jPt+s;ie rt+n : i 6= j: (3.14)
That is, an individual trader j's expectation about average expectations coincide with his
expectation of trader i's expectation for any i 6= j. By property (4) of projections we know
that
Pt;je rt+n = Pt;jPt+s;ie rt+n (3.15)
if and only if 
t(j)  
t+s(i) which contradicts the denition of non-nested information sets
and completes the proof. 
Proposition 3 showed that individual traders can systematically predict the average pre-
diction errors made by other traders. To see how this induces speculative behavior, consider









where  > 0 so that trader j's expectation about e rt+2 is higher than what he thinks the
current average expectation of e rt+2 is. Since trader j knows that other traders will receive
new information in period t + 1, he thinks that other traders on average will revise their










A positive  thus implies that trader j believes that other traders will revise their expecta-








and trader j0s expectation of the one period return on a 3 period bond (e b2
t+1  e b3
t) is lower
than his expectation about other traders expectations about the one period return, since by
(2.11) the price of a 2 period bond in t+1 depends negatively on the average expectation in
t+1 of e rt+2:3 Ceteris paribus, for a positive  trader j expects to hold less than the average
trader of the 3 period bond, as he thinks others on average expects it to have a higher return.
A symmetric argument holds if  is negative.
3.3. Forward rates and average higher order prediction errors. So far, we have dis-
cussed the implications of non-nested information sets from the perspective of the individual
trader. We now turn to the implications of non-nested information sets for aggregate bond
prices, or more specically, for implied forward rates. In the next proposition, we show
that the speculative dynamics introduced by non-nested information sets can be expressed
as average predictions about higher order prediction errors of future short rates. That is,
3The argument will hold as long as there is not a perfect negative correlation between revisions to R
Pt+s;j0rt+1 and
R
Pt+s;j0rt+2 for s = 0;1.14 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
predictions about the dierence between future short rates and other traders' predictions
about future short rates.
Proposition 4. The forward rate fn
t can be decomposed into the the average rst order
































































The term on the second line of (3.21) is the average prediction of the n 1 order prediction
error, i.e. the average prediction of the dierence between the actual short rate in period
t + n and the n   1 order expectation of the short rate in period t + n.4 The expression
(3.21) thus demonstrates that even in the absence of time varying risk premia, forward rates
do not necessarily reect average expectations about future short rates.
In a model with perfect or common information, the higher order prediction errors on
the second line of (3.21) would of course be zero and the n period forward rate would be a
function of only the period t average expectation of the the short rate in period t+n (and the
exogenous supply shocks). This would also be true in a model where bonds are only traded
when they are issued and then held until maturity. In such a setting, the expectation of other
traders' expectations would not matter for the equilibrium price, since the price of a zero
coupon bond at maturity is simply its face value, which is known to all traders. The price
of the bond at the date of issue would then simply be such that the return on an n period
bond equals the expected return on the alternative investment. (By imposing this condition
for all maturities n; it can be shown that this alternative return is the average expectation
4In a dierent context, Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) shows that a similar term (which they label the
\higher order wedge") can be expressed as an average expectation error of the innovations to the fundamental
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of the cumulative return of holding a series of one period bonds for n periods.) The new
dynamics introduced to the term structure by non-nested information sets contained in the
higher order prediction error term is thus dependent on the fact that long bonds are traded
frequently. This is also the sense in which the \speculative behavior" in this model conforms
to the denition of Harrison and Kreps (1978).
There are also some dierences between the model presented here and the set up of Har-
rison and Kreps (1978) that are worth noting. The most important of these is perhaps that
Harrison and Kreps rule out short sales, with the implication that the price of the asset in
their model is bounded below by what any single trader would be willing to pay for it, were
he to hold on to the asset forever. In our model, there are no short sales constraints and
the price of a bond can be either above or below what the equilibrium price would be if the
bond could not be traded before maturity.
3.4. Speculative dynamics and public information. It is straightforward to show that
the speculative dynamics due to higher order prediction errors are orthogonal to public
information. Before proving this statement, we rst dene two relevant information sets.
Denition 7. The subspace 

p
t is the space spanned by the history of publicly observable
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Proposition 5. The forward rate fn
t can be decomposed into the projection of e rt+n onto
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t+s(j) for all j and s = 0;1;:::;m 1 and by Property 4 of orthogonal projections
(see Appendix A) we have that
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for all all j and s = 0;1;:::;m   1. The term on the second line of (3.22) is thus identically






























which concludes the proof. 
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the new term structure dynamics introduced by non-
nested information sets are orthogonal to public information which by denition is common
knowledge. This is intuitive, since all traders know that all traders know, and so on, that
all traders know that all traders observe a public signal and that the public signal therefore
cannot be used to predict the errors that other traders will make. The component of other
traders' projection errors that are predictable by an individual trader j must therefore be
orthogonal to public information.
This ends the theoretical part of the paper. Before turning to the data, we can summarize
our ndings so far. Individual traders can identify and take advantage of predictable excess
returns, even though risk premia are constant. The model thus provides an alterative expla-
nation of predictable excess returns that is not based on agents valuing a marginal increase
in wealth dierently in dierent states of the world. We also demonstrated that the new
dynamics introduced by speculative behavior is orthogonal to public information. This has
an interesting empirical implication: Speculative dynamics cannot be detected using public
data in real time. However, as econometricians we can use public information from periods
t + s : s > 0 to extract an estimate of the term due to the speculative dynamics in period t:
To do so, we need to specify a process for the short rate and traders' information sets.
4. The Estimated Model
In the previous section it was demonstrated that non-nested information sets introduce
new dynamics to the term structure of interest rates. Here, we address the question whether
these dynamics are quantitatively important. Above, bond prices were derived as functions
of higher order expectations of future short rates. In order to have an operational model
that can be estimated, we need to specify two more objects: A process for the short rate
and the information sets of the traders.
4.1. The short rate. The short interest rate e rt is the sum of three exogenous factors













0 follow the vector autoregressive process
xt = Axt 1 + Cut : ut  N(0;I3) (4.2)SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 17
















are normalizations that do not restrict the dynamics of e rt: The three factor structure is
motivated by two considerations. It gives a suciently high dimensional latent state to
make the ltering problem of traders interesting, while keeping the model computationally
tractable. In addition, using three factors implies that if traders were perfectly informed,
the model would simply be a three factor ane no-arbitrage model with a constant price of
risk.
4.2. Traders' information sets. All traders observe a vector of public signals containing
the current short rate e rt and selected bond yields collected in the vector yt: Non-nested
information sets are introduced through individual signals about the rst two factors x1
t and
x2
t. Each signal is the sum of a the true factor and an idiosyncratic noise component and the
noise is uncorrelated across signals and time. The vector of private signals zt(j) observed by















Since the short rate is observed directly and is the sum of the three factors, it is without





t(j) e rt y0
t
0 (4.5)
contains all the signals that trader j observes in period t. Trader j's information set in period




implying that traders condition their expectations on the entire history of observed signals.
4.3. The solved model. When traders have non-nested information sets it becomes optimal
to form expectation about other traders' expectations, and natural representations of the
state in this class of models tend to be innite.5 The model is solved using the method
proposed in Nimark (2010) which delivers a law of motion for the (nite dimensional) state
Xt of the form
Xt = MXt 1 + Net (4.7)












5See Townsend (1983), Sargent (1991) and Makarov and Rytchkov (2009).18 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK















t = xt: The integer k is the maximum order of expectation considered and
can be chosen to achieve an arbitrarily close approximation in the limit as k ! 1:
Common knowledge of the model is used to pin down the law of motion for Xt; that is,
to nd M and N in (4.7). As usual in rational expectations models, rst order expectations
x
(1)
t are optimal, i.e. model consistent estimates of the actual factors xt: The knowledge
that other traders have model consistent estimates allow traders to treat average rst order
expectations as a stochastic process with known properties when they form second order
expectations. Common knowledge of the model thus implies that second order expectations
x
(2)
t are optimal estimates of x
(1)
t given the law of motion for x
(1)
t : Imposing this structure
on all orders of expectations allows us to nd the law of motion for the complete hierarchy
of expectations as functions of the structural parameters of the model, i.e. the parameters
governing the short rate (4.1), traders' information sets (4.6) and the parameter v governing
the standard deviation of the bond supply shocks vt. The vector et contains the aggregate
shocks in the economy, i.e. the factor innovations ut and the bond supply shocks vt.
For a given law of motion (4.7), bond prices can be derived using the average expectation





































t = 0 : k > k: Combing the operator H that moves expectations one step
up in orders of expectations and the matrix M from the law of motion (4.7) that moves
expectations one step forward in time allows us to compute the higher order expectation in




















s 1 Xt + v
n
t (4.11)
The matrix M governs the actual dynamics of e rt while bonds are priced as if Xt was
observed by all agents and followed a process governed by MH. The matrices M and MH
are thus analogous to the \physical" and \risk neutral" dynamics in a standard no-arbitrage
framework, though the interpretation is dierent and we can call M and MH; respectively,
the \physical" and \full information" dynamics of Xt.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 19
Since log bond prices are a linear function of the state Xt plus the supply shocks vt we
can use the denition of bond yields yn
t =  n 1e bn
t to also write the vector of bond yields yt
as linear function of the state and the supply shocks
yt = BXt + b vt (4.12)
where the element of the vector b vt associated with the n period yield is given by n 1vn
t : The
state equation (4.7) and the yield equation (4.12) constitutes a state space system that can
be used to let the observed history of bond yields inform us about the most likely values of
the parameters of the model. More details on how the model was solved can be found in the
Appendix.
4.4. Posterior Estimates. The solved model, i.e. the state space system (4.7) and (4.12),
is in a form that can be estimated directly by likelihood based methods. The standard
deviations of an n period bond supply shock vn
t is specied as nv, and supply shocks
are assumed to be independent across maturities. The presence of the supply shocks vt
thus add v as a single new parameter to estimate along with the the parameters of the
short rate process (4.2) and the private signals of traders (4.3). The vector of parameters
to be estimated is denoted   fA;C;Q;vg and consists of a total of 12 parameters.
I use monthly data of the Federal Funds rate and the 3, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 month
annualized interest rates on Treasuries taken from the CRSP data base. These are the same
maturities that the traders inside the model are assumed to observe. The sample period is
from January 1964 to December 2007 (528 monthly observations) and chosen to coincide with
the sample period used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) and Duee (2008). The time series
are demeaned. The posterior parameter distributions was simulated by 500 000 draws from
an Adaptive Metropolis algorithm (see Haario, Saksman and Tamminen (2001)), initialized
from a parameter vector found by maximizing the posterior using the simulated annealing
maximizer of Goe (1996). There are some large discrete mean adjustments in the rst 200
000 draws of the Markov chain, but visual inspection suggests that both rst and second
moments have converged after 500 000 draws.6 The results based on the last 250 000 draws
are reported in Table 1. The posterior mode b  is the parameter vector of the simulated
posterior Markov chain that achieves the highest posterior likelihood.
6More details, including the simulated posterior Markov chain and recursive plots of parameter standard
deviations, are available to download from the author's web page.20 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
Table 1
Posterior Parameter Estimates 1964:1-2007:12
 Mode b  Prior dist. Posterior 2.5%-97.5%
Short rate process
1 0.990 U (0;0:99) 0.989 - 0.990
2 0.989 U (0;0:99) 0.987 - 0.990
3 0.696 U (0;0:99) 0.655 -0.750
c1 11.2 U (0;50) 7.42 - 26.8
c2 0.62 U (0;50) 0.59 - 0.65
c3 0.48 U (0;50) 0.45 - 0.51
c21 -11.9 U ( 50;50) ( 27:4) - ( 8:11)
c31 -0.49 U ( 50;50) ( 0:54) - ( 0:45)
c32 0.38 U ( 50;50) 0.34 - 0.43
Noise in private signals
q1 0.35 U (0;50) 0.24 -1.14
q2 1.01 U (0;50) 0.61- 1.34
Bond supply shocks
v 0.21 U (0;50) 0.20 - 0.21
Log likelihood at b : -248.18
By themselves, the posterior estimates are not very interesting, but we can note that all
parameters appear to be well-identied. The rst two factors are very persistent and traders
appear to have more precise private information about the rst factor than about the second,
that is q1 < q2. The standard deviation v of the supply shocks are similar to the estimated
standard deviation of measurement errors in latent factor models (e.g. Duee 2008).
Figure 2 displays one period ahead tted values together with the actual (demeaned) data
series for selected yields. The interpretation is similar to the t of a VAR and it is clear that
the model can explain most of the observed variation in yields.
4.5. Historical speculation. The previous section showed that the speculative term intro-
duced to the term structure by non-nested information sets could be expressed as a higher
order prediction error that is orthogonal to public information. Nevertheless, we can quan-
tify this term using public price data since the period t higher order prediction error is only
orthogonal to public information known up to time t. As econometricians, we can use the
full sample and exploit information for t + s : s > 0 to back out information about the





for a given parameter vector  (e.g. Durbin and Koopman 2002).
The simulation smoother together with the posterior distribution of  can thus be used to
construct the posterior distribution of the state p
 
XT j yT
. Once we have a posterior dis-
tribution of the state, it is straightforward to compute the distribution of the speculativeSPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 21

















Figure 2. Data (black solid) and one-sided model t (blue dashed).

































Figure 3 displays the median and the 95% (point-wise) posterior probability intervals for the
speculative term in the one (n = 12) and ve (n = 60) year forward rates.
The speculative term in the two maturities are strongly correlated and potentially quan-
titatively important at both short and long maturities. At their peaks, around 1981, the22 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
median estimate is 3.5% and 2.5% for respectively, the 1 and 5 year forward rates. The 95%
probability interval reaches even higher, and is above 5% for the the speculative term in
the 1 year forward rate. One way to interpret these numbers is the following. If a \naive"
observer in 1981 took the implied forward rate as an indicator of market expectations about
the short rate in 1982, the magnitude of the mistake he would make by not controlling for
the speculative term would be 3.5%.
Singleton (2006) points out that violations of the expectation hypothesis in US data are
most pronounced when the period 1979-1983 is included in sample, and the episode in the
early 1980's is also the most eye-catching (and volatile) in Figure 3. Since the speculative
term (4.13) is (up to the supply shocks vt) the dierence between the implied forward rate
and the average expectations of the future short rate, the speculative term has some features
that other models may attribute to time varying risk premia. However, the interpretation
our model suggest is quite dierent. The period 1979 - 1983 coincides with the so-called
Volcker disination when the then Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker raised interest
rates sharply to bring ination under control (see for instance the account in Goodfriend
and King 2005). Once ination credibility had been established, short interest rates began
to fall, though long rates stayed high for some time. The estimated model suggests that this
was an episode when rst order expectations of future short rates where signicantly lower
than higher order expectations. That is, individual traders may have found it credible that
Volcker would be able to keep future short rates low before they believed that other traders
had been convinced as well. This contrasts with the alternative explanation that this was a
period when traders demanded either more compensation to hold a given amount of risk, or
when the amount of risk was perceived to be higher than usual.
4.6. Quantifying the importance of speculative dynamics. We can also use the esti-
mated model to quantify the relative importance of speculation at dierent maturities. The
left panel of Figure 4 displays the median and the 95 per cent probability interval of the rel-
ative standard deviation of the speculative term and forward rates. At the one year horizon,
the relative standard deviation of the speculative term is around 15% at the median and
rises to approximately 30% at the peak at around a maturity of three years (n = 36). It is
also evident from the gure that the speculative term is not only quantitatively important,
but it is also statistically signicant, with the 95% probability interval clearly bounded away
from zero. (The statistical signicance of the speculative term is somewhat obscured by the
point-wise nature of the probability intervals in Figure 3.)
The right panel of Figure 4 displays the relative standard deviation of the speculative term
in yields, computed as the recursive average of the speculative term in forward rates. We
can see that the speculative term is quantitatively important also for yields, and more so at
long horizons, peaking at the four year maturity where it reaches 22.5 % at the median. The
fact that speculative dynamics appear to be more important for longer maturities may also
help explain the evidence in G urkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) who argue that current
macro models of the term structure have trouble explaining the \excess" variability of long
bond yields. Embedding a non-nested information structure in a macro model may improve
these models' ability to match the variance of long term yields.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 23




Speculative term in 12 month forward rate




Speculative term in 60 month forward rate
Figure 3. Estimated speculative term (percentage points) in 12 and 60
month implied forward rate 1964:1 - 2007:12. Median (solid) and 95% proba-
bility interval (dotted).
4.7. The estimated dispersion of expectations. The dynamics of the model depend
importantly on that traders' information sets are non-nested. As noted in the introduction,
one implication of non-nested information sets is that expectations will be dispersed. This
fact can be used as an independent check to gauge whether the estimated model requires
a reasonable degree of expectations dispersion to t the data. Since no information about
expectation dispersion is used in the estimation process, this can be thought of as an informal
test of over-identifying restrictions.










The 95 per cent probability intervals for n = 12; 36 and 60 of the posterior distribution
of dispersion of rst order expectations are reported in Table 2. The rst row (n = 12)
is directly comparable to the survey evidence reported by Swanson (2006). The dispersion
implied by the estimated model is signicantly smaller than that of the Blue Chip survey. The
spread between the 10th and the 90th percentile of a Gaussian distribution is approximately
2.6 standard deviations. The estimated spread is thus approximately 0:12  2:6 = 0:31 or24 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK

















































Figure 4. Estimated relative standard deviation of speculative term in for-
ward rates (left panel) and yields (right panel). Median (solid) and 95% prob-
ability interval (dotted).
around 30 basis points at the median and around 40 basis points at the 97.5 percentile. The
estimated dispersion is thus smaller than even the lower end (80 basis point) of the spread
reported by Swanson. The model can thus not be considered to rely on an implausibly large
dispersion of expectations to t the data. This should increase our condence in the model.
Table 2








n 2.5% Median 97.5%
12 0.08 0.12 0.15
36 0.06 0.09 0.11
60 0.05 0.07 0.08
All numbers in percentage points (1 basis point = 0.01).
Table 2 also reports the dispersion of expectations at the three and ve year forecast
horizon. The spread is slightly decreasing at longer horizons. Of course, at long enough
horizons the dispersion will disappear as expectations of all agents will converge to the
unconditional mean of short rates.
5. The Model and the Evidence from Statistical Term Structure Models
In this section, we relate the estimated model above to some of the statistical evidence from
no-arbitrage factor models. We do three things. First, we show that the model with non-
nested information sets compares favorably with an ane three factor no-arbitrage model
in terms of tting the dynamics of the term structure, in spite of having fewer parameters.
Secondly, we demonstrate that if the world is characterized by the model presented here,
an ane three factor no-arbitrage model would nd overwhelming but misleading evidenceSPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 25
in favor of time varying risk premia. Thirdly, we show that the model can account for the
\hidden" factors found by Duee (2008).
5.1. An estimated ane three factor no-arbitrage model. A three factor no arbitrage
model can be described by the following equations (see Ang and Piazzesi 2003). The three
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where   is diagonal and 	 is lower triangular with ones on the diagonal. (These are nor-
malizations that do not aect the estimated yield dynamics, see Joslin, Singleton and Zhu
2010.) The short rate is a linear function of the factors
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The ane model is estimated using likelihood based methods.The parameter vector F to
be estimated consists of  , 	;;  and 2
vF where 2
vF is the variance of the yield measurement
errors vF
t (assumed constant across maturities). First, a preliminary mode is found by
maximizing the likelihood over the free parameters using a simulated annealing algorithm.
This mode is then taken as the initial value for the parameter vector in an Adaptive Metroplis
algorithm used to construct a posterior estimate of the parameters. The nal mode b F is the





To formally compare the t of the no-arbitrage model and the non-nested information model,
one should ideally compute the posterior odds ratio. This involves computing the marginal
likelihoods of the two models which is computationally demanding and the results are often
inaccurate. One approximation of the posterior odds ratio that has the benet of being easy




















where MF and M denotes respectively, the no-arbitrage and the non-nested information
model. The Schwarz approximation is thus similar to a (log) likelihood ratio but with a
correction for the number of parameters.
Estimating the no-arbitrage model on the same sample used in Section 4 yields a log
likelihood at the mode of  893:99, which is signicantly lower than the log likelihood
( 260:77) of the non-nested information model.7 This is in spite of the fact that the
number of parameters in the non-nested information model is signicantly fewer than in
7More details on the estimation of the ane three factor no-arbitrage model is available from the author's
web page.26 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK










Figure 5. Histogram of Schwarz approximation to the posterior odds ratio
of the restricted and unrestricted three factor no-arbitrage model estimated
on articial data.
the three factor no-arbitrage model (12 vs 19). The Schwarz approximation will thus fur-
ther punish the no-arbitrage model and gives an approximate log posterior odds ratio of
 893:99   ( 260:77)   1
2 (19   12)ln528 =  655:16: The Schwarz approximation thus sug-
gests that the no-arbitrage model is e 655:16  0 times as likely as the non-nested information
model.
To be fair, ane no-arbitrage models are able to also match the average slope of the yield
curve, while here we estimate both models on demeaned data. It is nevertheless interesting
to see that the more parsimonious model matches the deviations from the sample mean
better. In principle, we could also use 7 additional parameters to adjust the average supply
of bonds so that the non-nested information model also matches average yields. The number
of parameters of each model would then be the same.
5.2. Detecting constant risk premia with a no-arbitrage model. Ane three factor
no-arbitrage models are known to provide a good t of the term structure of interest rates
(e.g. Due and Kan 1996). However, if the world is characterized by bond markets where
traders with non-nested information sets interact, low dimensional ane no-arbitrage models
are misspecied. The reason is that in dynamic models where agents have non-nested infor-
mation sets, natural state representations tend to be innite dimensional (see for instance
Townsend (1983), Sargent (1991) and Makarov and Rytchkov (2009)). In the estimated
model of the previous section, the true model is approximated with a 75 dimensional state
vector. Given the structure imposed by higher order expectations by common knowledge
of rationality, the model places stringent restrictions on the dynamics of the observable
variables, in spite of the high dimensional state vector.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 27
In this section, we investigate what an ane three factor no-arbitrage model would nd
if the estimated model of the previous section represents the true data generating process.
We are particularly interested in nding out whether a three factor no-arbitrage model will
correctly detect that risk premia are constant in the model that generated the articial
data. The experiment we conduct is the following. We rst draw parameters from the
posterior distribution of the non-nested information model and for each draw we generate
528 observations. The no-arbitrage model is then estimated by maximum likelihood and for
each sample of articial data we also re-estimate the model imposing the restriction that
risk premia is constant, which implies setting  in (5.4) equal to zero. We then compute the
Schwarz approximation to the posterior odds ratio of the restricted and unrestricted model.
This procedure was repeated 2500 times.8
Figure 5 displays the histogram of the posterior odds ratios of the restricted model with
 = 0 and the unrestricted model. If the restriction of no time-varying risk premia was
supported by the data, the (log of the) posterior odds ratio should on average equal zero.
Instead, the average log posterior odds ratio is around -1400. The Schwarz approximation
to the posterior odds ratio then suggest that the restricted model is only e 1400  0 as likely
as the unrestricted model. In other words, the restricted model has approximately zero
probability of being the true model compared to the model with time varying risk premia,
in spite of the fact that the data is generated by a model with constant risk premia. Of
course, this does not prove that the actual data generating process is a model with non-
nested information sets and constant risk premia. However, it does demonstrate that the
evidence from this popular class of statistical models is not sucient reason to conclude that
risk premia are time varying.
5.3. Hidden factors and predictable excess returns. Duee (2008) provide evidence of
a \hidden" factor that is insignicant in explaining the cross-section of yields but important















on US bond data and the estimated model can be rotated to compute the implied principal
components. Duee nds that while the rst three principal components explain almost
all of the unconditional variation in yields, the fth principal component is important for
explaining expected future short rates. He illustrates this by impulse response functions
of the 5 factors and their eect on the short rate. If a factor is unimportant for the cross
section, but important for predicting short rates (and in extension, excess returns) it will
manifest itself as an impulse response function of the short rate to the factor in question
that originates at zero but then becomes positive (or negative).
We investigated whether the hidden factor found by Duee is consistent with the model
presented here by again generating articial data sets using parameter draws from the esti-
mated posterior of our model with non-nested information sets. For each parameter draw,
we simulated 528 months of data and then estimated Duee's ve factor model by maximum
8The procedure is very time consuming and the 2500 repetitions took about 5 weeks to compute.28 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK





















































Figure 6. Impulse responses to orthogonal factor innovations, dashed lines
are 5th and 95th percentile.
likelihood and performed the rotations to nd the principal components. We then computed
impulse responses of short rates to orthogonal innovations to the factors. This procedure
was repeated 450 times. Figure 7 shows the median impulse response and the 5th and 95th
percentile.9 As we can see, the fourth and fth principal components have little eect on
the short rate in the impact period, but becomes more important at longer time horizons.
This is exactly what we should expect from a model where the term structure does not
reveal all information about future short rates perfectly. If the state of the model would
be revealed perfectly by the cross section of yields, no additional factors beyond the three
(level, slope and curvature) that explains the cross sections would be useful to predict future
yields. However, if the state is not revealed by the cross section, then by construction there
must be additional factors that can help predict future yields.
6. Conclusions
Introducing private information in a model of bond pricing can give rise to speculative
behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978). For traders in the model to engage in
speculative behavior it is sucient that information sets are non-nested, or equivalently that
there is dispersion across traders' forecasts of future short rates. Dispersed expectations are
also sucient for traders to be able to predict excess returns, and the model thus provides a
new explanation for predictable excess returns that is not based on the value traders attach
to a marginal increase of wealth in dierent states of the world.
9The percentile refer to the percentiles of the point estimates from Duee's model estimated on articial
data and can thus not be given a probabilistic interpretation. A full Bayesian posterior simulation for each
draw of articial data is too time consuming to be feasible.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 29
Theoretical models of private information in asset markets dates back at least to Gross-
man (1976). More recently, Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) presented a single risky asset,
nite horizon model with an information structure similar to the one presented here. They
show that a concern among market participants about other market participants opinions as
described in Keynes' (1936) \beauty contest" metaphor of the stock market, can be present
among fully rational traders if traders have access to private information. Here we have
demonstrated that even if the estimated amount of private information is small in the sense
that the dispersion of (rst order) expectations across traders is low, speculative trade driven
by attempts to exploit perceived market mispricing of bonds can be quantitatively impor-
tant. We showed this by formulating an empirically plausible model of the term structure
that was estimated using likelihood based methods. The model has fewer parameters than
a popular class of ane term structure models, but nevertheless ts the dynamics of bond
yields better. We also demonstrated how a historical time series of the eect of speculative
dynamics on implied forward rates can be estimated from public price data, in spite of the
fact that speculation according to the model is orthogonal to real time public information.
Excess returns in the model presented here are predictable with respect to individual
traders' information sets. While the speculative behavior this induces is shown to be poten-
tially quantitatively important, in the model it is orthogonal to public price data in real time.
One may then ask how these results relate to the large body of evidence documenting that ex-
cess returns are predictable using public information, e.g. Litterman and Sheinkman (1991),
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). First of all, there is nothing
in the mechanism proposed here that excludes speculative dynamics from co-existing with
time varying risk premia.
Having said this, we also demonstrated that a class of popular statistical models would nd
statistically signicant, but nevertheless misleading, evidence in favor of time varying risk
premia if the model with non-nested information sets is the true data generating process.
Since neither model nests the other, it is dicult to say anything with condence about
the reasons for this, but one can speculate that three factor no-arbitrage models may be
over-tting the data. This view is also supported by several recent papers. Bauer (2009)
and Barillas and Collin-Dufresne (2009) both show that ane factor models of the term
structure may be biased toward overstating the predictability of excess returns. There is
also survey evidence suggesting that excess returns may be less predictable than previously
thought. Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) show in a no-arbitrage model with learning that if
one imposes that the dynamics of expectations about future short rates should be consistent
with survey evidence, then the estimated variability of risk premia decreases. Bacchetta,
Mertens and van Wincoop (2008) show that predictable forecast errors from survey data are
closely related to predictable excess returns in both bond and stock markets.
Recent studies have found that \unspanned" macro factors help predict excess returns,
e.g. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) and Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2010) while the model
here abstracts from public information not spanned by bond prices. Potentially, this could
have implications for the estimated importance speculative dynamics. One possibility is
that there are publicly observed unspanned factors that have exactly osetting eects on
short rate expectations and risk premia (as in the model of Joslin et al 2010). These factors
would then appear not to be priced, i.e. these factors would not be spanned by current30 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
bond prices, but could still help predict future excess returns. The public information set
of the model presented here would then be too small and the importance of speculative
dynamics could be overstated. However, there is another interpretation of the results of
Ludvigsson and Ng (2009) and Joslin et al (2010) that is more favorable to our model. In
both studies cited above, the macro information is dated according to the calender time of
the quantity that it measures. As an example, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for say
January is dated as January in the bond pricing model and not dated as February, when
the data is actually made public. In a perfect information setting like Joslin et al's this
distinction is unimportant as traders are assumed to observe the true state of the world at
all times. However, in imperfect information models this distinction becomes important. To
see why, note that a natural explanation why the predictive content of January CPI may
appear not to be spanned by bond prices in January is that it is not observed until February.
If interest rates moves at the time of the data release (i.e. in February), this will create
the impression that January CPI in the bond price model helps predict excess returns. The
fact that bond prices respond at the time of the many macro economic data releases (see for
instance Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright 2007) lends support to the latter interpretation.
Whether there is relevant public information that is unspanned by bond prices but captured
by macro economic data that is available in real time is thus arguably still an open question.
Ultimately, one would like to have a model that encompasses both time varying risk premia
and speculative trade. In such a model, the identifying distinction that excess returns due
to time varying price of risk should be predictable from public information in real time could
potentially form the basis for a three-way statistical decomposition of the yield curve, adding
a speculative term to the type of decomposition made by for instance Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005). The relative importance of time varying risk premia and speculative dynamics could
then be addressed more directly.
Finally, the zero-coupon bonds traded in the present model have a known value at maturity.
The uncertainty about future bond prices arise solely from the uncertainty about the discount
rates that apply between the current period and the period when a bond matures. Arguably,
these discount rates should matter also for the pricing of other assets that will be traded
and pay dividends in the future. To the extent that there is additional uncertainty about
dividend payments and returns on other classes of assets, speculative dynamics may be even
more important in other markets than the bond market.
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Appendix A. Some useful properties of projections
This Appendix reproduces some results and properties of orthogonal projections on inner-
product spaces that are used in Section 3 of the main text above. Proofs and more details
can be found in for instance Brockwell and Davis (2006).
Denition 1. (The inner-product space L2:) The inner product space L2 is the collection
C of all random variables X with nite variance
EX
2 < 1 (A.1)
and with inner-product
hX;Y i  E (XY ) : X;Y 2 L
2 (A.2)
Denition 2. Let 
 be a subspace of L2: An orthogonal projection of X on 
 , denoted
P
X, is the unique element in L2 satisfying
hX   P
X;!i = 0 (A.3)SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 33
for any ! 2 
:
Orthogonal projections have the following useful properties:
(1) The projection P
X coincides with the conditional expectation E [X j 
] in linear
models with Gaussian shocks.
(2) Let 
0 be a subspace of 
 and 
0? its orthogonal complement in 
: Then each ! 2 

has a representation as a sum of an element in 





(3) X 2 
? if and only if P
X = 0, where 




2 if and only if P
1X = P
1P
2X for all X 2 L2:
Property (1) is obviously useful as it allows us to use property (2) - (4) to analyze traders's
expectations in a model with linear constraints and Gaussian shocks. Property (2) was used
in the proof of Proposition 5 where we decompose bond prices into a component that is
the projection of future short rates on public information and into a component that is
orthogonal to public information. Property (3) is used to show that individuals can predict
average expectations errors when information sets are non-nested. Property (4) is used to
show both that in the absence of supply shocks the expectations hypothesis holds in our
model with respect to a public information set and that individual traders can predict other
traders' prediction errors as well as excess returns when information sets are non-nested.
Appendix B. Solving the model
Solving the model implies substituting out the higher order expectations from the bond
pricing equation (2.13). We are looking for a solution of the form
Xt = MXt 1 + Net (B.1)
























That is, to solve the model, we need to nd the matrices M;N and B as functions of the
parameters governing the short rate process, the stochastic supply shocks and the idiosyn-
cratic noise shocks. The integer k is the maximum order of expectation considered and can
be chosen to achieve an arbitrarily close approximation to the limit as k ! 1: Here, a brief
overview of the method is given, but the reader is referred to Nimark (2010) for more details
on the solution method.
First, common knowledge of the model can be used to pin down the law of motion for the
vector Xt containing the hierarchy of higher order expectations of xt: Rational, i.e. model
consistent, expectations of xt thus implies a law of motion for average expectations x
(1)
t
which can then be treated as a new stochastic process. Knowledge that other traders are
rational, means that second order expectations x
(2)
t are determined by the average across34 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
traders of the rational expectations of the stochastic process x
(1)
t . Third order expectations
x
(3)
t are then the average of the rational expectation of the process x
(2)
t ; and so on. Imposing
this structure on all orders of expectations allows us to nd the matrices M and N. Section
B:2 below describes how this is implemented in practice.
Second, the method exploits that the importance of higher order expectations are decreas-
ing with the order of expectation. This has two components:
(i) The variance of higher order expectations of the factors xt are bounded by the variance
of the true process, or more generally, the variance of k + 1 order expectation cannot be


























and the fact that since x
(k+1)
t is the average of an optimal estimate of x
(k)
t the k = 1 order
error "
(k+1)
t must be orthogonal to x
(k+1)












































and the inequality (B.3) then follows immediately. (This is an abbreviated version of a more
formal proof available in Nimark (2010).)
That the variances of higher order expectations of the factors are bounded is not su-
cient for an accurate nite dimensional solution. We also need (ii) that the impact of the
expectations of the factors on bond yields are decreasing \fast enough" with the order of ex-
pectation. To understand why this is the case, it helps to rst note that the full information






That is, under full information, all orders of expectations of the factors coincide with the
true factors at all times. Dene the full information solution, i.e. bond yields as a function
of the true state x
(0)
t as
yt = e Bx
(0)
t + b vt (B.8)








for the appropriate choices of n. By chance, for some t, all orders of expectations can coincide
also in the non-nested information case. Yields in the non-nested information model should
then be the same as the yields in the full information model: If everybody believes that
everybody agrees about what the current \true" state x
(0)
t is; they must also agree about
their expectations about future short rates. For this to then result in the same yields as aSPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 35




































t 8k and where the Bjs are the sub matrices of B in the non-nested information
solution (B.2). Since e B is nite, the sequence B0;B1;:::;Bk;::: must be a convergent series,
which implies that limk!1 Bk = 0:
Summing up, we can use common knowledge of the model to derive a law of motion for
the hierarchy of expectations of the factors xt: We can then nd an approximate solution
for bond yields of the form
yt =





















where the coecients Bk that tend to zero as k ! 1; are multiplied with a k order expec-
tation, where the variance of the expectations are bounded from above by the variance of
the true state x
(0)
t : The accuracy of the solution for the k chosen in the estimated model is
discussed below in section B:4.
B.1. Bond yields as a function of the state. For a given law of motion (4.7), bond
prices can be derived using the average expectation operator H : Rk ! Rk that annihilates













































Combing the operator H that moves expectations one step up in orders of expectations and
the matrix M from the law of motion (4.7) that moves expectations one step forward in time36 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK



























s 1 Xt + v
n
t (B.15)
By stacking the yield formula (B.1) for appropriate maturities n gives the matrix B in (B.2).
B.2. The law of motion of higher order expectations of the factors. To nd the
law of motion for the hierarchy of expectations Xt we use the following strategy. For a given
M;N and B in (B.1) - (B.2) we will derive the law of motion for trader j's expectations of
Xt ; denoted Xtjt(j)  E [Xt j 
t(j)]: First, write the vector of signals St(j) as a function of




t(j) e rt y0
t
0 (B.16)























Agent j's updating equation of the state Xtjt(j) estimate will then follow





Rewriting the observables vector St(j) as a function of the lagged state and taking averages
across traders using that
R
t(j)dj = 0 yields
Xtjt = MXtjt 1 + K
 
DMXt 1 + (DN + RA)et +  DMXtjt 1(j)

(B.20)
= (M   KDM)Xtjt 1 + KDMXt 1 + K (DN + RA)et (B.21)
Appending the average updating equation to the exogenous state gives us the conjectured
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[K (DN + RA)] 

(B.23)
where []  indicates that the a last row or column has been canceled to make a the matrix
[] conformable, i.e. implementing that x
(k)






















The model is solved by nding a xed point that satises (B.2), (B.22), (B.23), (B.24) and
(B.25).
B.3. Numerical issues. It is well-known that due to nite machine precision, the Kalman
lter may be unstable in applications where some state variables (or some linear combination
of state variables) are estimated very precisely compared to others, see Simon (2006). This
manifests itself as a Kalman lter covariance matrix P that is numerically not symmetric
and/or positive semi-denite. In our model, there are three latent factors, but a linear
combination of them (i.e. the short rate e rt) is observed perfectly and solving the model
as above may (and for some parameterizations, do) give rise to numerical inaccuracies. To
avoid this problem, we can rewrite the short rate process as




















































to get a system of similar form as in Section B:2 above
b Xt = c M b Xt 1 + Net (B.28)
yt = b B b Xt + Ret + Bre rt (B.29)
but where yields now also depend on the current short rate directly. We also need to adjust
the measurement equation for trader j to be






















The updating equation of trader j0s state estimate is now given by
b Xtjt(j) = c M b Xtjt 1(j) + b K
h
St(j)   D1c M b Xt 1jt 1(j)   D2 b Xt 1jt 1(j)   Dre rt 1
i
(B.32)
Since the additional term D2 b Xt 1 in trader j's measurement equation is a function of the
lagged state b Xt 1, the innovation representation is non-standard. The Kalman gain b K in
(B.32) is the steady state (t ! 1) Kalman gain of the modied Kalman lter













D1 b C + b R
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D1 b C + b R
0 1
P = P+1 (B.34)
  b K
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D1 b C + b R
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P+1 = c MP c M + b C b C
0 (B.35)
For a derivation of the modied lter, see Nimark (2009).
c M and b N are found in the same way as in (B.22), (B.23), i.e. by taking averages of the































The resulting system is algebraically equivalent to the system in B:2, but does not suer
from numerical instability.
B.4. The accuracy of the solution. While it can be shown that the impact coecients
of higher order expectations on yields are a convergent sum, exactly how many orders of
expectations that are needed for an accurate solution in a given application depends on the
parameters of the model. In the model estimated in Section 4 k = 25. Figure 8 displays
the posterior distribution of the loadings onto the dierent orders of expectations of the
factors for the 12, 36 and 60 month yields, that is, the posterior distributions of the odd (left
column) and even (right column) numbered elements of the rows of the relevant rows of B
in (4.12). As we can see, the loadings approaches zero quite quickly and the loadings onto
the factors for the 12 month yield are approximately zero for k > 12. For longer maturities
(36 and 60 months shown), the loadings are practically zero for k > 15. Choosing k = 25
thus seems more than sucient.SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE TERM STRUCTURE 39


















































Figure 7. Estimated posterior (higher order) factor loadings, median (solid)
and 95% probability interval (dotted). First column contains loadings onto
the (higher order expectations of the) rst factor x1
t, with order of expectation
k on the x-axis for yields of 1, 3 and 5 years to maturity. Second column
contains the same information regarding the second factor x1
t
Code and data used to estimate the model and generate gures are available at the author's
web page.